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Issues and Recommendations 
China – Japan – South Korea 
A Tense Ménage à Trois 
China, Japan and South Korea are the largest econo-
mies in East Asia and, as such, play a decisive role in 
the region’s prosperity and stability. A trilateral for-
mat for talks between the three states was triggered by 
the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. Since 2008, 
separate summit meetings, a secretariat and a series 
of specialist meetings have been established within 
this framework to explore possibilities for establishing 
closer economic and (security-) policy cooperation. 
This mechanism can contribute to stabilising a region 
characterised by growing tensions and security risks –
particularly in relations between the three states. Our 
study presents both the respective bilateral relations 
within this triad and the successes, setbacks and limi-
tations of the trilateral format to date. 
The US and North Korea also play an important part 
in the security complex of Northeast Asia. Japan and 
South Korea are formal Washington allies while Sino-
US relations are increasingly characterised by strategic 
rivalry. North Korea continues to be supported by 
China, but South Korea, Japan and the US view it as a 
threat to peace and stability in the region. This com-
plicated and fluid context raises the question of just 
how robust the trilateral format is. 
The study reaches the following conclusions: 
 China’s and South Korea’s respective political rela-
tions with Japan suffer from two structural prob-
lems: first, history and its contrasting interpreta-
tions; second, territorial disputes that have been 
smouldering for decades. Beijing and Seoul have 
comparable points of conflict, but they only have 
a limited impact on their bilateral relations. Japan 
sees not only North Korea but increasingly also 
China as a security threat because the latter has 
increased its (para)military activities in waters 
claimed by Japan. As yet, South Korea does not 
share this perception of China as a danger. 
 Nationalist politicians have assumed the leader-
ship of all three countries – Xi Jinping in China, 
Abe Shinzo in Japan, and (recently ousted) Park 
Geun-hye in South Korea. This initially reinforced 
the negative trajectory in Beijing’s and Seoul’s rela-
tions with Tokyo while Xi and Park became closer. 
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These political trends are also reflected in public 
opinion in the three countries. 
 Trade links between the three countries are close, 
especially since China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. However, the 
three increasingly view each other as competitors 
in the global market. Japan and South Korea have 
invested heavily in China since the 1990s, yet they 
do not feature among the most targeted countries 
for Chinese investment. 
 The US plays a central role in the three Northeast-
Asian states’ relations with each other. Its military 
alliances with Japan and South Korea make Beijing 
suspicious. The US is trying to improve the fraught 
Japanese-Korean relations in order to drive forward 
trilateral cooperation on security matters with its 
allies. For China, this is part of a strategy to encircle 
and contain it; it views the US as a strategic rival 
despite being economically interwoven with it. 
 Relations within the trilateral format are also 
shaped – and, in the case of South Korea and China, 
often disturbed – by North Korea. Beijing continues 
to grant Pyongyang material aid to prevent the 
country’s collapse, despite its growing frustration 
over Kim Jong-un’s unilateral actions. South Korea 
is certainly aware that there can be no solution to 
the Korea issue without China (and the US), but it 
has little sympathy for Beijing’s taking sides with 
the North. 
 The specific catalyst for the creation of the China-
Japan-South Korea format was the Asian financial 
crisis, which made it desirable to reinforce economic 
cooperation between the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations, ASEAN, and the three large partner 
countries (known as ASEAN Plus Three or APT). As 
early as 2001, the trio started to confer independ-
ently of ASEAN on such topics as environmental 
protection and fishing. It established a series of tri-
lateral talk formats between ministries, but also 
informal dialogues. Annual summits between heads 
of government were initially held on the fringes of 
APT meetings. 
 After a break in 2005, the trilateral cooperation was 
intensified, expanded and institutionalised from 
2007 to 2012. The impetus was the change of gov-
ernment in Japan and South Korea and the global 
financial crisis of 2008/2009. However, renewed 
bilateral tensions between Japan and the other two 
states – triggered by island disputes – led to the sus-
pension of high-ranking official meetings in 2013 
and 2014. In less sensitive areas, such as the envi-
ronment and disaster prevention, the rounds of 
talks continued. The trilateral secretariat set up in 
South Korea also continued its activities and kept 
communication going at the operational level. 
 While tensions with Japan persisted, all three 
states, and especially South Korea, sought to revive 
the trilateral format from late 2014 onwards. In 
2015 there were meetings not only of foreign minis-
ters but of heads of government as well. Negotia-
tions resumed on a trilateral free-trade agreement, 
but no timetable was set for their conclusion. Whilst 
there was talk of fully normalised relations between 
the three states, in 2016 the trilateral configuration 
remained fragile and susceptible to bilateral mood 
changes. 
 Thus far, the balance sheet of the trilateral format’s 
achievements in practical cooperation is mixed, but 
rather modest. Specifically, security policy remains 
essentially limited to non-traditional areas, such as 
counter-terrorism and disaster prevention. More 
progress has been made in environmental protec-
tion and the economy. 
 The trilateral format is nevertheless significant in 
that it offers a formalised framework for exchanging 
views and initiating joint projects. In times of 
heightened bilateral tensions, this also keeps open 
channels of communication below the level of “high 
politics”. Trilateral meetings can be innocuous even 
when the political atmosphere makes bilateral 
meetings seem impossible. 
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Political tensions are growing between China, Japan 
and South Korea, the three most important economies 
in Northeast Asia. Sino-Japanese relations in particular 
are characterised by suspicions despite their economic 
cooperation; Korean-Japanese relations are also fraught. 
What has been lacking is a regional organisation or 
institution that could play a stabilising role. The hope 
that such an organisation might emerge from the Six-
Party Talks1 is unlikely to be realised in the foreseea-
ble future. This study therefore addresses a different 
constellation, which has so far received little atten-
tion: the trilateral cooperation between China, Japan 
and South Korea. This began as part of the Asian 
financial crisis in the late 1990s and later led to 
independent summit meetings and the creation of a 
shared secretariat. However, political tensions 
between the three countries meant that no meetings 
were held at the highest level from 2012 to 2014. It 
was not until 2015 that there were significant 
renewed efforts to revive the format and drive it 
forward. 
This study focuses on the period starting with the 
changes of leadership in the three states involved: Xi 
Jinping assuming the offices of party chairman and 
president of China (November 2012, March 2013), Abe 
Shinzo being re-elected as prime minister of Japan 
(December 2012), and Park Geun-hye gaining the presi-
dency of South Korea (February 2013). All three were 
known as strong leaders and, given their power and 
mandates, were thought capable of taking courageous 
political steps in their respective countries. However, 
in December 2016, President Park was provisionally 
removed from office by the South Korean parliament 
over a corruption and cronyism scandal. In March 
2017, the Constitutional Court upheld the impeach-
ment decision, forcing Park from office and triggering 
procedures for an early presidential election. 
In a speech to the US Congress in May 2013, Presi-
dent Park pointed to what she called “Asia’s paradox” 
 
1 The Six-Party Talks were launched in 2003 to convince 
North Korea via negotiations to abandon its nuclear pro-
gramme. The participants were both Koreas, China, the US, 
Russia and Japan. Agreements were reached in 2005 and 
2007/2008, which turned out to be shortlived. There have 
been no further six-party talks since 2009. 
– the contradiction between growing economic inter-
dependence and lasting deficits in political and secu-
rity cooperation in Northeast Asia.2 Even though Park 
referred to a “disconnect” between these two spheres, 
it raises the question of possible spill-over effects. Does 
economic integration have a stabilising impact on 
political relations or does the worsening of political 
relations, on the contrary, take a toll on economic 
interaction? 
This study examines the bilateral dynamics be-
tween the three states, the reasons behind the revival 
of the trilateral talks and the format’s potential – 
topics that have hitherto rarely been subjected to 
scholarly analysis. The central question it addresses 
is whether trilateral cooperation can establish a new 
pattern of interaction in Northeast Asia or whether 
this process only confirms and reproduces already 
existing, primarily negative trends. The study focuses 
on examining developments in the three dyads 
(meaning the bilateral relations), and providing a 
systematic overview of the current extent of trilateral 
cooperation. It looks at the following issues: 
 Is there a correlation between bilateral relations 
and trilateral cooperation? Under what circum-
stances did increased cooperation between the 
three countries come about? 
 In which areas has trilateral cooperation made 
substantial progress, and in which are trilateral 
talks still difficult? 
 What are the three parties’ expectations in reviving 
the talks? Are there interests that they can best (or 
only) pursue within the trilateral format? 
 How do the US and North Korea influence the tri-
partite configuration? 
 
2 See “Full Text of Park’s Speech at U.S. Congress”, Yonhap 
News Agency, 8 May 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/ 
national/2013/05/08/4/0301000000AEN20130508010800315F.
HTML (accessed 1 August 2016). Chinese authors have adopted 
the expression and refer to a “politics/economy paradox” 
(zhengjing beilun). See Wang Lin and Huang Peng, “Jiakuai 
Zhong Ri Han zimaoqu tanpan mianlin de huanjing yu zhan-
lüe quxiang” [Environment and strategic direction for accel-
erating the China-Japan-Korea free trade zone], Duiwai Jingmao 
Shiwu, no. 2 (2015): 21–24 (22). 
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We consider China, Japan and South Korea to be part 
of a “regional security complex” that also includes the 
US and North Korea.3 This security complex is char-
acterised by various kinds of interdependence (con-
notated both positively and negatively) between the 
states in the region. Geographical proximity thus 
plays an important part in security relations because 
threats manifest themselves more easily over short 
distances than longer ones. Nevertheless, even extra-
regional actors (for instance the US) can be part of a 
regional security complex if they exert substantial 
influence over the security situation there.4 In any 
case, interdependence in security matters is stronger 
between states within the security complex than in 
relation to external states. According to Barry Buzan, 
security complexes are subsystems of the international 
system with their own structures and patterns of 
interaction. A security complex can be defined as a 
“set of units whose major processes of securitization, 
desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their 
security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or 
resolved apart from one another.”5 From this perspec-
tive, security is not an objective state, but the result 
of a social process. 
To understand relations between the three coun-
tries, it is imperative to consider history – not least 
because contrasting or competing narratives about 
the past continue to have an impact and impede co-
operation. 
 
3 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (London, 1998). 
4 David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, “The New Regional-
ism in Security Affairs”, in Regional Orders: Building Security in a 
New World, ed. David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997), 3–19 (12). 
5 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, Security (see note 3), 201. 
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Bilateral Relations: The Three Dyads 
 
Bilateral relations between the three countries are 
complicated, and each political relationship is always 
partly shaped by issues of historical interpretation, 
especially as regards China’s and South Korea’s view of 
Japan. Economic relations between the three countries 
continue to be close, but economic interdependence 
and complementarity are on a downward trend whilst 
competition is growing. In each of the three states, 
public opinion about the other two is also worsening, 
making a rapprochement risky in the domestic politi-
cal context. As Japan’s and Korea’s ally and China’s 
strategic competitor, the US has a decisive influence 
on the constellation of the three states and is an in-
tegral part of the Northeast-Asia security complex. 
China and Japan: Relative Rise and Decline 
Political Relations 
China and Japan normalised their relations in 1972 
when Washington – to Japan’s surprise – decided 
to initiate diplomatic relations with the People’s 
Republic of China.6 The political relationship between 
Tokyo and Beijing cannot be understood without 
reference to the territorial and maritime conflict over 
five uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, known 
in Japanese as the Senkaku Islands, in Chinese as 
the Diaoyu Islands (see map). The US returned these 
islands to Japan along with Okinawa in 1971; they 
have since been under Japanese administration and 
control. Beijing argues that the islands have been 
part of Chinese territory for centuries and that Japan 
seized them in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895.7 Tokyo 
 
6 After a secret visit to Beijing by the then-US Security 
Advisor Henry Kissinger in 1971, and the US’s subsequent 
change of direction officialised by President Richard Nixon’s 
visit, other Western states also established diplomatic rela-
tions with the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, in 
1971 the PRC was accepted into the United Nations where 
it assumed the Republic of China’s permanent seat on the 
Security Council. 
7 The 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki forced defeated China to 
cede the island of Taiwan to Japan. Taiwan was only returned 
to the Republic of China in 1945, after the end of World War 
II in the Pacific. The Republic’s President, Chiang Kai-shek, 
claims that it annexed the islands as terra nullius 
(no man’s land). 
Map 
Northeast Asia, showing the disputed islands 
Source: “Ripping Yarns: History Wars in North-East Asia”, 
The Economist, 18 August 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
21560617 (accessed 24 February 2017). 
The representation of history in school textbooks also 
regularly causes conflicts because of contrasting his-
torical perspectives. Controversy is likewise fanned by 
the visits of high-ranking Japanese politicians or even 
prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine, which com-
memorates Japanese war dead, including 14 found 
guilty of Class A war crimes (crimes against peace) in 
World War II. China and Korea accuse Japan of not 
critically confronting its World War II atrocities and 
not sufficiently apologising for them. Tokyo, by con-
trast, points to repeated apologies by its prime minis-
ters and the generous economic and developmental 
aid it provided to its neighbouring countries once 
relations had been normalised. 
 
withdrew to the island with his troops in 1949 after losing 
the civil war against the army of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
 
Bilateral Relations: The Three Dyads 
SWP Berlin 






Bilateral relations between Japan and China have 
noticeably deteriorated, in particular since 2010, a 
fact each blames on the other. On 7 September 2010, 
a Chinese fishing vessel rammed two Japanese coast 
guard boats that had ordered it to leave territorial 
waters claimed by Japan, 12 kilometres northwest of 
the disputed islands. The crew of the Chinese ship 
was arrested, but released again after a few days. The 
captain, however, remained in custody while the pub-
lic prosecutor’s office considered pressing charges. 
Beijing responded with harsh criticism, called off vari-
ous bilateral talks and threatened counter-measures. 
From 23 September to 19 November, China halted the 
export of rare earths to Japan, an act Tokyo considered 
a “form of economic warfare”.8 On 24 September, the 
Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan decided to end the 
crisis by releasing the captain; public opinion in his 
country saw this as buckling under Chinese pressure.9 
In September 2012 the territorial dispute escalated 
further when the Japanese government bought three 
of the uninhabited islands from their private owner 
to pre-empt purchase by the then-mayor of Tokyo, the 
rightwing nationalist Ishihara Shintaro. Japan had 
hoped to avoid a worsening of relations with China. 
But in Beijing’s interpretation, the purchase was a 
“nationalisation”, by which Tokyo had unilaterally 
changed the status quo of the islands. As with the 
fishing-vessel incident, the response in China was not 
only official protests but mass demonstrations and 
riots as well, during which Japanese shops and busi-
nesses were attacked. Simultaneously China multi-
plied its forays (including military forays) into waters 
claimed by Japan and their associated airspace, which 
in turn led to counter-measures by Tokyo.10 These 
actions – which continue to this day – risk causing 
misunderstandings and accidents: no mechanism of 
 
8 Christopher W. Hughes, “China’s Military Modernization: 
US Allies and Partners in Northeast Asia”, in Strategic Asia 
2012–2013, ed. by Ashley J. Tellis and Travis Tanner (Washing-
ton, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2012), 197–239 
(201). It has not been proved conclusively that China’s export 
ban was linked to the island dispute and the captain’s im-
prisonment. See on this point Linus Hagström, “Power Shift 
in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Incident in 2010”, Chinese Journal 
of International Relations 5, no. 3 (2012): 267–97. 
9 Hagström, “Power Shift in East Asia?” (see note 8). 
10 See Sheila A. Smith, “A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East 
China Sea. Contingency Planning Memorandum no. 18”, New 
York and Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, 
April 2013, http://www.cfr.org/japan/sino-japanese-clash-east-
china-sea/p30504 (accessed 3 February 2016). 
any kind to prevent the latter exists between the two 
sides. In November 2013, China unilaterally declared 
an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East 
China Sea, which overlapped with the Japanese one 
and included the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.11 
Japan and the US expressed concern over this further 
escalation of the conflict and declared that they had 
no intention of respecting the zone.12 Japanese Prime 
Minister Abe Shinzo’s surprise visit to the Yasukuni 
Shrine in December 2013, during his second time in 
office, once again poisoned the mood between China 
and Japan. 
In November 2014, President Xi received Prime 
Minister Abe for the first time when he met with him 
for a half-hour talk during the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Beijing. The meeting 
had been preceded by a “four point consensus” be-
tween the Chinese state councillor Yang Jiechi and 
the Japanese security advisor Yachi Shotaro, with both 
sides confirming in separate statements that they had 
differing views on the causes of the tensions in the 
East China Sea. Contrary to initial media reports, how-
ever, Japan did not shift from its official government 
position that there is no territorial dispute over the 
Senkaku Islands.13 Even though tensions have now 
somewhat lessened, the islands dispute, mutual dis-
trust and nationalistic fervour on both sides continue 
to put a strain on Sino-Japanese relations. Moreover, 
Beijing is exasperated by Japan openly positioning 
itself against China in the dispute over islands and 
rocks in the South China Sea.14 
 
11 For a detailed treatment, see Ian E. Rinehart and Bart 
Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), Congressional 
Research Service Report, no. R43894 (30 January 2015), 16f., 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43894.pdf (accessed 9 Au-
gust 2016). The ADIZ established by China also overlaps with 
South Korea’s. Initially the Japanese and South Korean air 
defence zones had also overlapped, but Tokyo and Seoul 
agreed on an adjustment in response to China’s action. 
12 Rinehart and Elias, China’s Air Defense Identification Zone 
(ADIZ) (see note 11), 16f. 
13 Adam P. Liff, Principles without Consensus: Setting the Record 
Straight on the 2014 Sino-Japanese ‘Agreement to Improve Bilateral 
Relations’, Working Paper (8 November 2014), http://www. 
adamphailliff.com/documents/Liff2014_PrinciplesWithout 
Consensus.pdf (accessed 11 August 2016). 
14 On the tensions in the South China Sea, see also Michael 
Paul, A ‘Great Wall of Sand’ in the South China Sea? Political, Legal 
and Military Aspects of the Islands Dispute, SWP Research Paper 
8/2016 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2016). 
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Security and Perceived Threats 
Distrust about the other side’s intentions has been 
growing in Japan and China for years. From around 
2005, the perception that China represents a military 
threat has increasingly come to the fore in Japan. 
Japanese Defence White Papers address China’s mili-
tary modernisation in detail and criticise the lack of 
transparency in the country’s defence spending. Since 
2007 these documents have also been expressing “con-
cern” over China’s military capabilities and activities. 
This is the first time since normal relations resumed 
in 1972 that the Japanese government has so clearly 
declared China a threat to its security.15 
In turn, China has met Prime Minister Abe’s secu-
rity agenda with suspicion. His goal is for Japan to 
contribute more actively to international stability and 
no longer merely react to events. Since his return to 
power in late 2012, Prime Minister Abe has not only 
driven forward security cooperation with the US, but 
also with other partners, especially in Southeast Asia. 
In September 2015, the Japanese parliament adopted 
a package of new security legislation that extends the 
deployment possibilities of the Japanese Self Defense 
Forces. For instance, if the security of its ally America 
came under threat, Japan could now provide military 
support to help defend against that threat. The Abe 
government has also relaxed rules for arms exports.16 
Ultimately, the prime minister aims to revise Article 9 
of the Japanese Constitution, which bans the country 
from martial activities and from maintaining armed 
forces – an Article whose interpretation has been the 
subject of much controversy. While Japan sees this as 
a process of normalising its security policy, China per-
ceives it as remilitarisation. 
 
15 Kai Schulze, “Kontinuität im Wandel oder erneuter 
Umbruch? Die Veränderungen der japanischen Sicherheits-
politik gegenüber China”, Asiatische Studien 67, no. 2 (2013): 
681–709 (684). 
16 See also Alexandra Sakaki, Japan’s Security Policy: A Shift 
in Direction under Abe? SWP Research Paper 2/2015 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2015), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/ 
2015_RP02_skk.pdf (accessed 8 February 2017). 
China and South Korea: 
One-sided Dependencies 
Political Relations 
China has traditionally had strong relations with 
North Korea; it is the only country with which the 
People’s Republic has a formal alliance treaty. As a 
consequence, Beijing’s relations with South Korea 
were normalised relatively late. Not until 1992 did 
China and South Korea diplomatically recognise each 
other – 20 years after China and Japan had established 
official relations. 
China and South Korea are also divided by an his-
torical question. In 2003 Chinese researchers declared 
that the ancient kingdom known in Chinese as Gao-
gouli, in Korean as Goguryeo – which in Korea is viewed 
as the cradle of Korean national identity – had been a 
vassal state of the Chinese empire and demanded that 
its tombs be categorised as Chinese by UNESCO.17 The 
border between (North) Korea and China is also contro-
versial on Changbai/Paektu Mountain – the birthplace 
of the late head of state Kim Jong-il, as modern legend 
has it. There are likewise competing maritime claims 
between China and South Korea, concerning two rocks 
used to determine the Exclusive Economic Zones.18 
Chinese fishermen entering disputed or foreign waters 
is a problem not only in the South China and East 
China Seas; it also puts a strain on Seoul’s relationship 
with Beijing.19 However, neither the maritime nor the 
historical points of conflict play as prominent a role in 
these relations as they do between China and Japan or 
Korea and Japan. 
Official relations between Beijing and Seoul have 
been steadily upgraded since 1992, although not in 
security policy. South Korea has to keep a balance 
between relations with its ally, the United States, and 
its most important economic partner, China – not an 
easy task.20 Since 2008, South Korea’s and China’s 
 
17 Christian Wirth, “‘Power’ and ‘Stability’ in the China-
Japan-South Korea Regional Security Complex”, Pacific Review 
28, no. 4 (2015): 553–75 (560). 
18 Wirth, “‘Power’ and ‘Stability’” (see note 17), 562. Exclu-
sive Economic Zones 200 nautical miles wide can be claimed 
beyond the territorial waters of coastal states. 
19 See e.g. “South Korea Cracks Down on Illegal Chinese 
Fishing”, The Wall Street Journal, 10 June 2016, http://www.wsj. 
com/articles/south-korea-cracks-down-on-illegal-chinese-
fishing-1465550310 (accessed 25 July 2016). 
20 See e.g. Jojin V. John, South Korea-China Relations and the 
Northeast Asian Strategic Puzzle, ICS Analysis no. 15 (Delhi: Insti-
tute of Chinese Studies [ICS], July 2014); Ellen Kim and Victor 
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deputy foreign ministers have met for strategic dia-
logue; however, this has not yet produced any joint 
declarations or similar document.21 Since Xi Jinping 
took over power and Park Geun-hye was elected presi-
dent, the two countries have moved closer together. At 
their first summit meeting in June 2013, far-reaching 
agreements werereached. In September 2015, Park 
visited the large military parade in Beijing for the 70th 
anniversary of the end of World War II. This demon-
stration of solidarity was in part driven by the policies 
of the Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, which 
were criticised in both Beijing and Seoul for being 
nationalist and revisionist.22 In 2015, and despite US 
reservations, South Korea was also one of the founding 
members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) proposed by China, which Japan has not joined. 
Security and Perceived Threats 
South Korea evidently does not feel threatened mili-
tarily by China to the extent that Japan does. The 
crucial disruptive factor in Sino-South Korean rela-
tions is – time and again – North Korea. On the one 
hand, the close (if not problem-free) friendship be-
tween China and North Korea was crucial in pushing 
Seoul to seek good relations with Beijing. On the other 
hand, China’s reactions to crises between the North 
and South of the peninsula regularly cause irritation 
and frustration in Seoul. To date, China has always 
sided with North Korea or at best acted in a “neutral” 
manner, calling on all parties to show restraint when-
ever Pyongyang has been involved in incidents. This 
was the case, for example, with the South Korean cor-
vette Cheonan, sunk by a torpedo in March 2010, for 
which North Korea was held responsible.23 A second 
incident in November 2010 concerned the North 
Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, located off the 
coast of South Korea, which prompted joint military 
exercises of the US and South Korea. Here, too, Beijing 
 
Cha, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: South Korea’s Stra-
tegic Dilemmas with China and the United States”, Asia Policy 
21 (2016): 101–21. 
21 See Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, “China-Korea Rela-
tions: Under New Leaderships”, Comparative Connections 14, 
no. 3 (2013): 99–107, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/1203q.pdf (accessed 8 Feb-
ruary 2017). 
22 See John, South Korea-China Relations (see note 20), 3. 
23 Yangomo Ku, “Transitory or Lingering Impact? The 
Legacies of the Cheonan Incident in Northeast Asia”, Asian 
Perspective 39, no. 2 (2015): 253–76. 
merely urged both sides to show restraint. There was 
no criticism or condemnation of North Korea. In 2013 
China agreed to sanctions against North Korea for the 
first time in the UN Security Council sessions, after 
the country had repeatedly conducted nuclear and 
missile tests. In spring 2016, Beijing again approved 
punitive Security Council measures against North 
Korea. 
In June 2016, after further North Korean missile 
tests, Seoul announced its plan to install an American 
anti-missile system (Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense, THAAD). China and Russia protested. Beijing 
was concerned that this would tie South Korea into a 
regional anti-missile system positioned, among other 
things, to contain China.24 In turn, South Korea ac-
cused China of having a hostile attitude that ignored 
Korean sovereignty over defence and national security. 
Beijing is nevertheless exerting economic and political 
pressure to make Seoul stall on implementing the deci-
sion – in the hope that, after elections in South Korea, 
the new government might rethink the stationing. 
According to an analysis carried out by American 
Korea experts in 2016, South Korea’s policy on China 
faces four dilemmas. The first is the asymmetry and 
imbalance of power between South Korea and its large 
neighbour; the second results from the increasing 
importance of China as Korea’s economic partner. 
Third, from Seoul’s perspective, China’s cooperation 
is indispensable if the two Koreas are ever to be re-
united; Beijing, however, has a strategic interest in 
maintaining the status quo, with North Korea as a 
buffer state. Fourth, South Korea is concerned about 
being caught in a growing escalation between the US 
and China.25 Beijing too finds relations with Seoul 
far from simple because they are substantially deter-
mined by the quality of the latter’s relations with the 
US and North Korea – as well as by Beijing’s own 
relations with Washington.26 
 
24 See Benjamin Lee, “THAAD and the Sino-South Korean 
Strategic Dilemma”, The Diplomat, 7 October 2016, http:// 
thediplomat.com/2016/10/thaad-and-the-sino-south-korean-
strategic-dilemma/ (accessed 23 November 2016). 
25 See Kim and Cha, “Between a Rock and a Hard Place” 
(see note 20). 
26 See Snyder and Byun, “China-Korea Relations” (see note 21), 
104. 
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Japan and South Korea: Distant Neighbours 
Political Relations 
Japan and South Korea share values such as democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law, and they both feel 
threatened by North Korea. The two countries are also 
the US’s most important allies in Asia. Despite these 
commonalities, mistrust and historical animosities 
strain bilateral relations. In South Korea, vivid memo-
ries of repression and exploitation under Japanese 
colonial rule from 1905 to 1945 are still impeding 
political cooperation that would be advantageous 
for both sides. 
The main source of conflict in this bilateral rela-
tionship is the fate of the Korean “comfort women”, 
forced into prostitution in Japanese military camps 
during World War II. In Tokyo’s view the Treaty on 
Basic Relations between Japan and South Korea in 
1965 resolved all questions of reparations; there is 
no basis for further claims; and there is no official 
evidence that women were systematically and forcibly 
recruited by the Japanese authorities. Seoul counters 
that the fate of the “comfort women” was unknown 
until victims voiced their stories in the early 1990s 
and that the 1965 negotiations therefore could not 
possibly have covered the issue.27 In 1994 Japan did 
create a fund with the help of private donations to 
financially support the women involved. For many 
Koreans, however, this is merely an attempt by the 
Japanese government to evade formal compensation 
and an official apology. 
A cluster of rocks in the Sea of Japan, controlled by 
South Korea where it is known as Dokdo, yet claimed 
by Japan, also regularly causes bilateral tensions (see 
map, p. 9). Japan argues that it annexed the islands, 
which it calls Takeshima, as terra nullius in accordance 
with international law in 1905. According to South 
Korean tradition, however, the islands were consid-
ered part of the Korean island state as long ago as 
1145. Seoul thus sees the annexation as the opening 
salvo of Japanese imperialist ambitions towards Korea.28 
Also contentious in Japan’s relations with Korea (as in 
its relations with China) are the visits of high-ranking 
 
27 Shogo Suzuki, “Can the ‘History Issue’ Make or Break the 
Japan-ROK ‘Quasi-Alliance’?”, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 
27, no. 2 (2015): 201–15 (203). 
28 Norbert Eschborn and Janine Läpple, “Südkorea auf der 
Suche nach sich selbst”, KAS Auslandsinformationen, November 
2013, 39, http://www.kas.de/wf/de/33.36021/ (accessed 20 July 
2016). 
politicians to the Yasukuni Shrine and the representa-
tions of history in school textbooks. 
Phases of closer cooperation between the two coun-
tries alternate with reignited tensions over historical 
conflicts. Whenever the threat of North Korea increases 
and US commitment to the region is simultaneously 
in doubt, Tokyo and Seoul tend to strive for closer co-
operation. Conversely, historical animosities are given 
freer reign as soon as the external threat seems dimin-
ished and the US clearly sides with its allies.29 
This pattern does not apply, however, to the “ice 
age” in Japanese-Korean relations, from 2012 to 2015. 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, which demon-
strated its technological progress, and doubts in Tokyo 
and Seoul over the US’s longterm commitment to Asia 
would normally have led to closer cooperation. And yet 
in June 2012, at the last minute, South Korea called off 
signing an agreement with Japan to exchange military 
intelligence (General Security of Military Information 
Agreement, GSOMIA) that had already been fully nego-
tiated.30 When, just two months later, Lee Myung-bak 
was the first Korean president to visit the Dokdo 
Islands, Japan responded by protesting and summon-
ing the South Korean ambassador. Relations deterio-
rated further under Lee’s successor, Park Geun-hye. 
For almost three years (until November 2015), Presi-
dent Park rejected bilateral summit meetings with 
Japan’s Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, on the grounds 
that Tokyo needed to take responsibility for its colo-
nial and wartime crimes. Because of these dire politi-
cal relations, the two countries allowed a currency-
swap agreement to expire in January 2015.31 
Many South Korean journalists and academics 
blame the bilateral tensions on Japan’s nationalist 
tendencies under Prime Minister Abe.32 Yet, while 
Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 
undoubtedly provoked additional resentment, rela-
tions had already deteriorated before he took office. 
 
29 Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-
Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1999). 
30 Seongho Sheen and Jina Kim, “What Went Wrong with 
the ROK-Japan Military Pact?”, Asia Pacific Bulletin (East West 
Center), no. 176, 31 July 2012, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/private/apb176.pdf (accessed 13 July 2016). 
31 Mitsuru Obe and Kwanwoo Jun, “Japan, South Korea to Let 
Currency Swap Program Expire”, Wall Street Journal, 16 Febru-
ary 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-south-korea-to-
let-currency-swap-program-expire-1424088419 (accessed 10 
July 2016). 
32 Suzuki, “Can the ‘History Issue’ Make or Break the Japan-
ROK ‘Quasi-Alliance’?” (see note 27), 206. 
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The main cause for the standoff lies in South Korea’s 
domestic politics: two court verdicts from 2011 and 
2012 put the Korean government under considerable 
pressure to take a stronger stance against Japan on 
historical matters.33 In August 2011 the Korean Con-
stitutional Court ruled that the government had 
violated the basic rights of the “comfort women” 
by neglecting their cause. In May 2012 the Supreme 
Court further adjudged that personal claims for 
damages by former slave labourers were not covered 
by the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations. Since then, 
several claims for compensation against Japanese 
firms have come before the Supreme Court.34 
In effecting a rapprochement with Beijing over the 
past few years, Seoul has probably primarily sought 
to influence China’s policy on North Korea. Japan is 
nonetheless concerned that there might be negative 
repercussions for it. Accordingly, Park’s visit to China 
in June 2013 was controversial in Japan. After all, she 
had broken with the tradition of South Korean presi-
dents making their first official visits to the US and 
then Japan.35 Japan was further affronted when Park 
suggested erecting a memorial in Manchuria to a 
Korean who, in 1909, had murdered the Governor 
of the Japanese colonial administration in Korea. 
Bilateral relations improved after Seoul shifted to 
a two-track policy towards Tokyo around May 2015.36 
Historical matters were now tackled separately from 
economic and security matters. Seoul was prompted 
not only by the US pushing for improved Korean-
Japanese relations (see below). Impetus also came from 
Chinese President Xi’s first meeting with Abe as part 
of the APEC Summit of November 2014 – Park was 
now isolated in her obstructive attitude towards 
 
33 Hideki Okuzono, “South Korean Judiciary Shakes Japan-
South Korea Relations” (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International 
Affairs, March 2016), http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_ 
library/korean_peninsula/160331_Hideki_Okuzono.pdf 
(accessed 3 April 2016). 
34 Kentaro Ogura, “Again, South Korean Court Orders 
Japanese Company to Pay”, Nikkei Asian Review, 24 June 2015, 
http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-
Relations/Again-South-Korean-court-orders-Japanese-company-
to-pay (accessed 15 July 2016). 
35 Anon., “Chūkan shunōkaidan nihon ni towareru higashi 
ajia senryaku” [Chinese-Korean summit meeting raises ques-
tions about Japanese East-Asia strategy], Yomiuri Shimbun, 
30 June 2013. 
36 Anon., “Park Signals Two-track Foreign Policy toward 
Japan”, Japan Times, 4 May 2015, http://www.japantimes.co. 
jp/news/2015/05/04/national/politics-diplomacy/park-signals-
two-track-foreign-policy-toward-japan/#.V6nasnqx4wI (ac-
cessed 9 August 2016). 
Japan. The first meeting between Park and Abe 
occurred in November 2015. A month later the two 
leaders announced a breakthrough in the “comfort 
women” dispute: Japan would pay a billion yen 
(around 9 million euros) into a South Korean foun-
dation for Korean victims, as yet to be founded. In 
addition, the Japanese foreign minister apologised 
in Abe’s name to the women concerned for their suf-
fering. Both sides declared that the agreement “finally 
and irreversibly” put an end to the dispute.37 Further 
rapprochement between Japan and South Korea fol-
lowed in 2016: in late August talks began on a new 
currency-swap agreement; in November an accord on 
sharing military information (GSOMIA) was signed. 
However, the dispute over “comfort women” flared 
up again. In December 2016 South Korean activists 
erected a statue in front of the Japanese consulate in 
the port city of Busan as a reminder of the victims. A 
similar statue has already stood in front of the Japa-
nese embassy in Seoul since 2011. Tokyo argues that 
this violates the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, under which the host country is obliged to pro-
tect the dignity of consular posts. In protest against the 
new statue, Japan temporarily withdrew its ambassa-
dor to Seoul and its consul-general to Busan. It also 
suspended talks on the new currency swap agreement.38 
At the same time, South Korean security experts 
and representatives of the conservative government in 
Seoul, faced with North Korea’s missile development, 
are calling for cooperation with Japan on security 
policy. For them, North Korea’s success in August 2016 
in firing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) 
represents a new order of threat because it enables 
the regime to more easily overcome the defences of its 
southern neighbour, which currently exclusively point 
north.39 The agreement on exchanging military intel-
ligence with Japan is supposed to garner knowledge 
about North Korea – and yet 59 percent of South 
Koreans reject it.40 Opposition parties accuse the gov-
 
37 Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan-ROK Pact on ‘Comfort Women’: 
Will It Help Heal the Wounds?”, Oriental Economist 84, no. 1 
(2016): 6ff. 
38 Anon., “Keep ‘Comfort Women’ Deal Alive”, Japan Times, 
12 January 2017, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/ 
01/12/editorials/keep-comfort-women-deal-alive/ (accessed 
13 January 2017). 
39 Anon., “Seoul Must Strengthen Its Missile Defense at All 
Cost”, Chosun Ilbo, 25 August 2016, http://english.chosun.com/ 
site/data/html_dir/2016/08/25/2016082501493.html (accessed 
22 November 2016). 
40 Gil Yun-hyung, “S. Korea and Japan Set to Sign Contro-
versial GSOMIA this Week”, Hankyoreh, 22 November 2016, 
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ernment of concluding the agreement when the pub-
lic’s attention was focused on a scandal surrounding 
President Park.41 Many Koreans doubt Japan’s sincerity 
in apologising for past atrocities because Tokyo simul-
taneously acknowledges its moral responsibility to-
wards victims of Japanese violence and yet declines 
any legal responsibility (and thus refuses to pay com-
pensation), citing the Treaty on Basic Relations. Mean-
while, Japan is disillusioned about the attempts at 
reconciliation because it feels that, regardless of past 
agreements, Korea is continually making new claims, 
thus moving the goalposts and making it impossible 
ever to reach a satisfactory conclusion.42 Should im-
plementation of the “comfort women” accord fail, 
Japan may be so discouraged that it could sour 
relations with Seoul for years. 
Security and Threat Evaluations 
Tensions in Japan-South Korea relations stem not only 
from domestic policy, but also from diverging stra-
tegic interests. The two countries are reacting differ-
ently to the rise of China. While Japan increasingly 
sees the People’s Republic as a threat and is trying 
to establish a counterweight with likeminded states, 
Seoul believes it is not China’s rise per se that consti-
tutes the threat, but rather the growing Sino-US rivalry 
in the region.43 South Korea wants to avoid being 
caught between the two and having to side with one 
or the other. Seoul is concerned that Beijing might 
consider closer Korean-Japanese cooperation on secu-
rity matters to be part of a containment strategy by 
the US and its allies.44 The future development of secu-
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771449.html (accessed 24 November 2016). 
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Pact”, Chosun Ilbo, 15 November 2016, http://english.chosun. 
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42 Hiroshi Nakanishi, “The Structural Change and Future 
of Japan-South Korea Relations: A Japanese Perspective”, East 
Asia Foundation Policy Debates, no. 34 (15 September 2015), 
http://www.keaf.org/book/EAF_Policy_Debate_The_Structural_ 
Change_and_Future_of_Korea-Japan_Relations:_A_Japanese_ 
Perspective?ckattempt=1 (accessed 21 July 2016). 
43 Alice Ekman, “China’s Rise: The View from South Korea”, 
EUISS Alert, no. 19 (Paris: European Union Institute for Secu-
rity Studies [EUISS], May 2016), http://www.iss.europa.eu/de/ 
publikationen/detail/article/chinas-rise-the-view-from-south-
korea/ (accessed 20 July 2016). 
44 Sungtae Jacky Park, “The Korean Pivot and the Return 
of Great Power Politics in Northeast Asia”, Atlantic Council, 
rity relations between Seoul and Tokyo therefore cru-
cially depends on China.45 
The new laws on security policy passed by Japan 
in September 2015 caused concern amongst South 
Koreans about Japan’s potential remilitarisation. The 
South Korean government, however, refrained from 
criticising the laws and merely expressed the hope 
that Japan would continue to “follow the spirit of its 
pacifist postwar constitution”.46 Under this new secu-
rity legislation, in the event of a crisis on the Korean 
peninsula, Japan could logistically support not only 
the US but also South Korea.47 Such cooperation is cur-
rently hard to imagine. With a majority of the Korean 
population rejecting the deployment of Japanese troops 
on the peninsula, Seoul would only accept Japan’s 
help in an extreme emergency. 
Public Opinion in the Three Countries 
Animosities and tensions within the dyads of the North-
east-Asia triangle are also reflected in public opinion 
polls about respective neighbours. Negative trends 
in these samples of the nation’s mood are sometimes 
instrumentalised by decision-makers for domestic 
politics, for instance in election campaigns. In China, 
the Communist Party increasingly relies on national-
ism to legitimise its reign. As a consequence, the Beijing 
leadership propagates a negative image of Japan. Con-
versely, public resentment and mistrust also limit the 
three governments’ ability to negotiate compromises 
in disputes with their neighbouring countries. 
Among the three dyads concerned, mutual public 
perception has deteriorated most noticeably in the 
Japan-China case. This negative trend has been visible 
since about the mid-1990s, apart from a few shortlived 
fluctuations.48 From 2010 to 2016 the proportion of 
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polled Chinese and Japanese who had an unfavourable 
or relatively unfavourable impression of the other 
country climbed by 21 percentage points to 77 percent 
and by 20 points to 92 percent, respectively (see graph 
1, p. 17). At times, it was above 90 percent in both coun-
tries. The most important reasons given by those polled 
in both countries are historical controversies as well 
as the bilateral territorial dispute; Japanese respon-
dents also attribute ruthless conduct in foreign-policy 
matters to China.49 
A negative trend has also characterised the Japanese 
perception of South Korea since the start of the cen-
tury. From 2002 to 2015 the proportion of Japanese 
who felt very or somewhat distrustful of the country 
rose from around 35 percent to 73 percent (see graph 
2, p. 17). After the accord in the “comfort women” dis-
pute in December 2015, this proportion had dropped 
to 60 percent by spring 2016. On the Korean side, the 
changes between 2002 and 2016 were less marked: 
the proportion of those who distrusted Japan, while 
remaining high, fluctuated between around 75 per-
cent and 90 percent. The national mood was barely 
affected by the 2015 accord (see graph 2, p. 17). Both 
sides agree that historical disputes and the bilateral 
territorial conflict are the most significant causes for 
the negative image of the other country.50 
Polls on mutual perception are conducted less regu-
larly in China and South Korea than in the other two 
dyads, making trends more difficult to discern. Overall 
the reciprocal impressions are more positive than for 
China-Japan or Japan-South Korea. On the Chinese side, 
however, the perception of South Korea seems to have 
deteriorated somewhat over the past decade. In 2006, 
63 percent of Chinese polled still declared that they 
had a very or somewhat favourable impression of the 
country; by 2016 that had dropped to 55 percent.51 
In Korea between 2002 and 2015, the proportion of 
respondents who had a very or somewhat favourable 
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49 Genron NPO, 11th Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll: Analysis 
Report on the Comparative Data (2015), 22 October 2015, 4, 
http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/2015forum_en.pdf (accessed 
8 February 2017). 
50 Genron NPO, The 4th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion 
Poll (2016): Analysis Report on Comparative Data, Juli 2016, 5, 
http://www.genron-npo.net/pdf/forum_2016_en.pdf (accessed 
9 September 2016). 
51 The 2016 survey took place before South Korea declared 
its intention in June of that year to deploy a THAAD missile 
defence system. It should be assumed that the nation’s mood 
has deteriorated since then. 
impression of China fluctuated between 38 and 66 per-
cent. Initially the share dropped continually, but as 
of 2013 it rose again (see graph 3). However, bilateral 
tensions since early 2016 seem to have had a negative 
impact on the public perception of China.52 While the 
Chinese and South Koreans viewed their normalised 
relations with great optimism in the 1990s, in the past 
decade divergent interests have become more obvious, 
especially regarding North Korea.53 Furthermore, both 
sides increasingly view themselves as economic com-
petitors. Unlike the Japanese, however, most Koreans 
do not feel threatened by the rise of China as a politi-
cal power. In a 2015 survey, 71 percent of South Ko-
reans polled declared that China was tackling inter-
national problems responsibly, whereas only 15 per-
cent of Japanese respondents agreed with this assess-
ment.54 
Trade and Economic Relations 
The three countries have close economic ties. In all 
three dyads, the volume of trade in absolute terms has 
greatly increased since the early 1990s (see graphs 4–9, 
p. 19). Despite these interdependencies, the three coun-
tries see each other as economic competitors. Japan is 
concerned that China, South Korea and other emerg-
ing rivals, such as India, will increasingly displace it 
from its position as a leading economic power and 
high-tech country. China is gradually climbing to the 
top of the value chain and striving to catch up with, 
and ultimately overtake, Japan and Korea in individu-
al sectors. Meanwhile Korea finds itself uncomfortably 
placed between the established economic power of 
Japan and a rapidly advancing China. 
Following China’s 2001 accession to the World 
Trade Organisation, trade with its neighbours grew 
significantly. Within a decade (2001–2011), China’s 
trade volume with Japan increased fourfold and with 
Korea sevenfold. Since 2011, however, trade between 
Japan and China has declined: in four years, it fell by 
approximately 20 percent. Between China and Korea, 
 
52 South Koreans and Their Neighbors 2016 (Seoul: Asan Institute 
for Policy Studies, May 2016), 9, http://en.asaninst.org/ 
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9 September 2016). 
53 Cho and Park, “Anti-Chinese and Anti-Japanese Senti-
ments in East Asia” (see note 48), 279. 
54 Genron NPO, The Genron NPO Japan-U.S.-China-ROK Opinion 
Poll Report, October 2015, 7f., http://www.genron-npo.net/ 
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Public Opinion in Japan and China: Mutual Impression 
From: Genron NPO, 12th Japan-China Joint Opinion Poll Analysis Report on the Comparative Data, September 2016, http://www.genron-
npo.net/pdf/2016forum_en.pdf (accessed 24 January 2016). 
Graph 2 
Public Opinion in Japan und South Korea: Mutual Trust/Distrust 
From: Poll by Yomiuri Shimbun and Hankook Ilbo, published in Yomiuri Shimbun on the following days: 21 March 2002, 10 June 2005, 
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Public Opinion in South Korea und China: Mutual Impression 
From: Bruce Stokes, How Asia-Pacific Publics See Each Other and Their National Leaders: Japan Viewed Most Favorably, No Leader Enjoys Majority 
Support, Pew Research Center Report (2 September 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/02/how-asia-pacific-publics-see-each-other-
and-their-national-leaders/ (accessed 15 September 2016); Bruce Stokes, Hostile Neighbors: China vs. Japan: View Each Other as Arrogant, 
Violent; Disagree on WWII Legacy, PEW Research Center Report (13 September 2016), http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/2/2016/09/Pew-Research-Center-China-Japan-Report-FINAL-September-13-2016.pdf (accessed 24 January 2017). 
 
meanwhile, trade continues to grow, albeit more 
slowly than in the first decade of the 21st century. 
China is both Korea’s and Japan’s largest trading part-
ner (see graphs 10–18, pp. 20f.). Korea’s volume of 
trade with China exceeds that of its trade with the US 
and Japan together. Korea and Japan primarily export 
intermediate goods to China and mainly import from 
China finished products.55 Japan’s significance for Chi-
na’s international trade has fallen sharply. Its share of 
China’s total external trade decreased from 20.4 per-
cent in 1995 to 7.2 percent in 2015. Over the same 
period, South Korea’s share grew only modestly, from 
6.1 to 7.1 percent. However, these figures do not give 
the whole picture because re-exports via Hong Kong 
play a considerable role in trade with China.56 
 
55 Françoise Nicolas, “Regional Production Networks in East 
Asia. A Focus on China, Japan and Korea”, in Emerging Asian 
Economies and MNCs Strategies, ed. Robert Taylor and Bernadette 
Andreosso-O’Callaghan (Cheltenham, 2016), 36–58 (41). 
56 This also provides a (partial) explanation for the discrep-
ancy between China’s and Japan’s official trade figures. Both 
show a trade deficit with the other country (see graphs 4 and 
8, p. 21). 
Overall, the trade volume between Japan and South 
Korea has also increased since 1990, though with 
bigger drops following the Asian financial crisis of the 
late 1990s and the 2008 global financial crisis. As with 
the two other dyads, there was especially strong growth 
in trade in the first decade of the 21st century: 150 
percent from 2001 to 2011. Since then, the trend has 
been reversed. Within only four years, the trade vol-
ume dropped by about a third. Some experts speculate 
that political tensions might be partly to blame for 
this decline.57 But other factors could also be involved, 
such as trade diversions because of bilateral free trade 
agreements with third countries. While Korea’s share 
of Japan’s external trade has remained fairly constant 
at about 6 percent, Japan’s share of Korea’s external 
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China, trade in goods with Japan (US dollars, billions) 
From (graphs 4–18): IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, accessed 
5 July 2016. 
Graph 5 
China, trade in goods with South Korea (US dollars, billions) 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 6 
Japan, trade in goods with South Korea (US dollars, billions) 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 7 
Japan, trade in goods with China (US dollars, billions) 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 8 
South Korea, trade in goods with China (US dollars, billions) 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 9 
South Korea, trade in goods with Japan (US dollars, billions) 
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China’s main trading partners 1995 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 12 
China’s main trading partners 2005 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 12 
China’s main trading partners 2015 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 13 
Japan’s main trading partners 1995 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 14 
Japan’s main trading partners 2005 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 15 
Japan’s main trading partners 2015 
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South Korea’s main trading partners 1995 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 17 
South Korea’s main trading partners 2005 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
Graph 18 
South Korea’s main trading partners 2015 
Quelle: IWF, Direction of Trade Statistics, eingesehen am 5.7.2016. 
trade dropped from 18.6 to 7.4 percent between 1995 
and 2015. 
Whilst a free-trade agreement between the three 
states has been proposed since 2003, to date there 
is only a bilateral accord between China and South 
Korea.58 Since the accord only came into force in 
December 2015, its impact on bilateral trade cannot 
yet be calculated. However, economists assume it will 
be modest, given the low level of trade liberalisations 
agreed: for instance, passenger cars – an important 
export sector for Korea – were completely excluded 
from the tariff reductions.59 
China nevertheless stresses the potential of a trilat-
eral trade agreement, pointing out that trade between 
the three states currently only accounts for about 21 
percent of their total trade while within the North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) the figure is 40 per-
cent, and within the EU as much as 65 percent.60 
Japanese and South Korean direct investment in 
China has almost continually risen since the early 
1990s. The 2015 figures for Japan were just under 
109 billion US dollars, for Korea 68 billion US dollars 
(a substantial amount, given its lower economic per-
formance).61 Almost a quarter of Korea’s foreign direct 
investment is therefore in China, as are just under 9 
percent of Japan’s (see graph 19, p. 22). Conversely, 
Japan is China’s third-largest direct investor (5.8 per-
cent of foreign direct investments in China) and Korea  
 
58 Negotiations began in May 2012. Xi and Park announced a 
breakthrough in November 2014 on the sidelines of the APEC 
Summit. The agreement was signed in June 2015. See Shannon 
Tiezzi, “It’s Official: China, South Korea Sign Free Trade Agree-
ment”, The Diplomat, 2 June 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/ 
06/its-official-china-south-korea-sign-free-trade-agreement/ 
(accessed 27 July 2016). 
59 Jeffrey J. Schott, Euijin Jung and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, 
An Assessment of the Korea-China Free Trade Agreement, Policy Brief 
15–24 (Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, December 2015), https://piie.com/publications/ 
policy-briefs/assessment-korea-china-free-trade-agreement 
(accessed 14 September 2016). 
60 See Lin and Peng, “Jiakuai Zhong Ri Han zimaoqu tanpan 
minalin de huanjing yu zhanlüe quxiang” (see note 2), 21. 
61 Details for Japan from: Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO), “Japan’s Outward and Inward Foreign Direct Invest-
ment”, compiled from data from the Japanese finance minis-
try and Bank of Japan, https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/ 
statistics/ (accessed 2 August 2016). Details for Korea from: 
The Bank of Korea, “ECOS Economic Statistics System”, http:// 
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Japan’s and Korea’s direct investment: shares 
 
China’s share of Japan’s 
foreign direct investments 
Korea’s share of Japan’s 
foreign direct investments  
Japan’s share of Korea’s 
foreign direct investments  
China’s share of Korea’s 
foreign direct investments 
1990 0.9 1.3 2.2  0.9 
1995 3.1* 1.3* 2.2  18.6 
2000 3.1 1.5 1.7  17.0 
2005 6.4 2.1 2.2  26.2 
2010 8.0 1.8 2.2  26.7 
2015 8.6 2.5 2.7  24.4 
* Data for 1996. 
From:  
Data on Japan’s direct investment portfolio 1990: Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
“OECDstat”, http://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed 11 June 2016).  
Data on Japan’s direct investment portfolio 1996–2015: 
JETRO, “Japan’s Outward and Inward Foreign Direct Investment”, 
compiled from data from the Japanese finance ministry and 
Bank of Japan, https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ 
(accessed 11 June 2016). 
 
Data on Korea’s direct investment portfolio 1990–2000: Orga-
nisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
“OECDstat”, http://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed 11 June 2016). 
Data on Korea’s direct investment portfolio 2005–2015: The Bank 
of Korea, “ECOS Economic Statistic System”, http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ 
flex/EasySearch_e.jsp (accessed 2 August 2016). 
 
its sixth-largest (2.4 percent).62 However, the real im-
portance of Japan and South Korea for China is likely 
to be greater than the relative percentage shares 
indicate, since the majority of investments in China 
are made via Hong Kong and are thus recorded as 
direct investments in Hong Kong. 
However, Japanese and Korean investment flows 
during the past few years show a gradual shift in 
preferences. In proportion to their total foreign invest-
ment, Japan’s and Korea’s investments in China are 
declining, while the share of investments made in 
Southeast Asia is rising. For example, in 2005 Korean 
investments in China still accounted for 39.3 percent 
of the country’s total foreign investments; by 2015 
this had dropped to only 10.5 percent.63 Measured 
against total Japanese foreign investment, the pro-
portion of investments in China decreased from 14.5 
to 6.8 percent over the same period.64 Rising wage 
 
62 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Coordinated Direct 
Investment Survey (CDIS)”, http://data.imf.org/?sk=40313609-
F037-48C1-84B1-E1F1CE54D6D5&sId=1390030109571 
(accessed 24 June 2016). 
63 Korea Eximbank – The Export-Import Bank of Korea, 
“Foreign Investment Statistics”, https://www.koreaexim.go.kr/ 
site/main/index002 (accessed 20 September 2016). 
64 JETRO, “Japan’s Outward and Inward Foreign Direct 
Investment”, compiled from data from the Japanese finance 
ministry and Bank of Japan, https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/ 
reports/statistics/ (accessed 2 September 2016). 
costs in China seem to be an important factor in 
this relocation of investments. In a 2015 poll by the 
Japanese external trade organisation JETRO, an over-
whelming majority of the Japanese entrepreneurs 
active in the Asian region (84 percent) declared that 
rising wage costs in China were problematic.65 At the 
same time, many Southeast Asian countries with their 
growing markets have become more attractive invest-
ment locations. It is hard to say to what extent the 
political tensions between Beijing and Tokyo, which 
emerged after 2012, influenced Japanese investors. In 
interviews, entrepreneurs acknowledge that they take 
into account these bilateral problems and the asso-
ciated anti-Japanese sentiment in China.66 
Proportionate to GDP, the level of foreign direct 
investment in Japan and Korea is generally modest 
compared to other OECD states. It is therefore not 
surprising that within the Northeast-Asia trio, invest-
ments in the two countries are also low. In 2015 
Korea’s share of Japan’s foreign direct investment was 
2.5 percent; Japan’s share of Korea’s total was 2.7 per-
 
65 JETRO, 2015 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese 
Companies in Asia and Oceania, 22 December 2015, https:// 
www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/_Reports/01/4be53510035c0688/ 
20150115_english.pdf (accessed 15 September 2016). 
66 Stephen Robert Nagy, “Territorial Disputes, Trade and 
Diplomacy: Examining the Repercussions of the Sino-Japa-
nese Territorial Dispute for Bilateral Trade”, China Perspectives, 
no. 4 (2013): 49–57. 
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cent. China only began investing abroad systematically 
and in greater amounts after 2000 (in line with its “go 
out” or “go global” policy). To date, however, neither 
Japan nor Korea seems to have become a significant 
target country for Chinese investments. In 2014 Japan’s 
share of China’s foreign direct investment was 0.3 per-
cent, as was Korea’s.67 It is not yet possible to ascertain 
whether the common investment agreement that 
came into force in May 2014 has had an effect on in-
vestment flows between the three countries. 
The Role of the US in China-Japan-South 
Korea Relations 
Because of its defence alliances with Japan (since 1951) 
and South Korea (since 1954), the US has a central role 
in relations between Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing. Since 
the second half of the 1990s, China has criticised the 
US’s five bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific 
as well as the North Atlantic defence alliance, NATO, 
as “obsolete” and “Cold War remnants”.68 In the early 
2000s, China would admit that the American alliance 
with Japan also prevented a stronger remilitarisation 
or even nuclearisation of the country – steps which, 
technologically, Tokyo could easily have achieved. 
Since then, however, a primarily negative evaluation 
has taken hold in China. Japan, it argues, can only 
afford its uncompromising attitude towards China, 
for instance over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, because 
American backing puts Tokyo in a position of strength.69 
US President Obama, during his visit to Japan in 
April 2014, confirmed Washington’s position, as for-
mulated in the 1970s: the US would not take sides in 
resolving whether the disputed islands belonged to 
Japan or China. Obama declared, however, that the 
Islands were covered by the bilateral security agree-
 
67 IMF, “Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS)” (see 
note 62). Note that much Chinese foreign investment is made 
via Hong Kong. 
68 See e.g. the report by Jiang Zemin to the 15th Party Con-
gress of the Chinese CP in 1997, “Hold High the Great Banner 
of Deng Xiaoping Theory for an All-round Advancement of 
the Cause of Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
into the 21st Century”, 12 September 1997, http://www. 
bjreview.com.cn/document/txt/2011-03/25/content_363499_ 
14.htm (accessed 4 November 2016). 
69 For a discussion of this argument, see Eric Hyer, “The 
U.S. and Japan May Literally Start a War over Rocks in the 
South China Sea”, The National Interest, 2 July 2016, http:// 
nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-japan-may-literally-start-
war-over-rocks-the-south-16823 (accessed 4 November 2016). 
ment since they were de facto under Japanese adminis-
tration. For the first time in public, he emphasised 
that the US rejected China’s unilateral attempts at 
weakening Japan’s control over the Islands.70 During 
a summit with Prime Minister Abe in February 2017, 
President Donald Trump confirmed his administra-
tion’s view that the bilateral Security Treaty covered 
the Senkaku Islands.71 
China is also suspicious about the defence alliance 
between South Korea and the US, which aims to pro-
tect against the military threat emanating from North 
Korea. Beijing regularly criticises joint US-Korean mili-
tary drills – especially those carried out in waters close 
to the coast – for destabilising the region. 
Japanese-Korean relations are not only affected 
by how the US commitment in the region is gauged. 
Washington also actively influences its two most im-
portant allies in Asia since closer cooperation between 
the three countries strengthens America’s influence 
in the region and increases its leverage. For example, in 
the late 1990s, the US initiated trilateral consultations 
through the Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight 
Group (TCOG) to facilitate coordinating policies on 
North Korea. Since Pyongyang’s first atomic test in 
2006 and the foundering of the Six-Party Talks in 2009, 
Washington has attempted to revive those consulta-
tions (which had become dormant) as well as the tri-
lateral security cooperation.72 Following an American 
initiative, the deputy defence ministers of the US, 
Japan and South Korea now meet to intensify coopera-
tion on security matters; since 2012 the three countries 
have been conducting joint manoeuvres, for example 
a first joint missile-defence drill in mid-2016.73 How-
ever, as the 2012–2015 “ice age” in Japanese-South 
Korean relations reveals, American influence is lim-
 
70 Mark E. Manyin, “The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) 
Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations”, CRS Report, no. R42761, 
14 October 2016, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf 
(accessed 11 November 2016). 
71 Julie Hirschfeld Davis and Peter Baker, “In Welcoming 
Shinzo Abe, Trump Affirms U.S. Commitment to Defending 
Japan”, New York Times, 10 February 2017, https://www. 
nytimes.com/2017/02/10/world/asia/trump-shinzo-abe-
meeting.html?_r=0 (accessed 23 March 2017).  
72 Ayumi Teraoka, “Gaiatsu ga hagukumu nikkan an-
zenhoshō kyōryoku” [Japan-Korea security cooperation: 
driven by external pressure], Seijigaku Kenkyū, no. 49 (2013): 
135–71 (154). 
73 Siehe Prashanth Parameswaran, “US, Japan, South Korea 
Conduct Joint Missile Drill”, The Diplomat, 30 June 2016, 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/us-japan-south-korea-
conduct-joint-missile-drill/ (accessed 25 July 2016). 
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ited. Nonetheless, President Obama was able to con-
vince President Park and Prime Minister Abe to hold a 
first meeting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security 
Summit in The Hague in March 2014.74 Additionally, 
at Washington’s urging, Tokyo, Seoul and Washington 
signed a trilateral agreement on exchanging intelli-
gence on North Korea in December 2014.75 As men-
tioned above, an equivalent bilateral agreement 
between Japan and South Korea foundered in 2012, 
despite having been fully negotiated. Evidently, the 
US also engineered a breakthrough in the “comfort 
women” dispute. The American political scientist 
Daniel Sneider believes that this December 2015 agree-
ment “could not have been reached without the 
concerted pressure of the Obama administration”.76 
Relations between the US – the only superpower 
left after the Cold War – and an economically as well 
as militarily ambitious China is characterised by 
mutual distrust, regardless of the two countries’ close 
economic ties. On the US side, it is widely assumed, 
especially in security circles, that China wants to chal-
lenge America’s (military) primacy in the West Pacific 
and make the region more difficult for the US to 
access. In China, meanwhile, there is a widely held 
conviction that Washington strives to contain China 
and obstruct its rise. Beijing views the policy launched 
under US President Obama of “rebalancing” or “piv-
oting” towards East Asia as an expression of this 
American containment and encircling strategy. While 
the Chinese leadership has been promulgating a “new 
type of great-power relations” between Beijing and 
Washington since 2012, which aims to avoid a bila-
teral confrontation, regionally the signs of a power 
struggle and strategic rivalry between the two have 
become more noticeable. Donald Trump’s victory 
in the US presidential elections in November 2016 
caused concern in Japan and South Korea, specifically 
 
74 Kentarō Yamamoto, “Kokkō seijōka kara 50nen no nikkan 
kankei: Rekishi, ryōdo, anzenhoshō mondai o chūshin ni” 
[Japan-Korea relations 50 years after normalisation: a focus on 
history, territory and issues in security policy], Refarensu, May 
2015, http://dl.ndl.go.jp/view/download/digidepo_9368696_ 
po_077203.pdf?contentNo=1 (accessed 10 July 2016). 
75 For the text of the agreement, see “Document: Trilateral 
Agreement to Share Information on North Korean Missile 
and Nuclear Programs”, USNI News, 28 December 2014, https:// 
news.usni.org/2014/12/28/document-trilateral-agreement-
share-information-north-korean-missile-nuclear-programs 
(accessed 25 July 2016). 
76 Daniel Sneider, Advancing U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Coopera-
tion: A U.S. Perspective, NBR Brief (30 March 2016), http://www. 
nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=662 (accessed 15 July 2016). 
that the new administration might steer an isolation-
ist course and reduce America’s engagement in Asia. 
Beijing, meanwhile, is bracing itself for a more dif-
ficult relationship with the US under its new presi-
dent, after Trump announced during the election cam-
paign that he would be pursuing a tougher approach 
to China – both in trade and currency policy and as 
regards the situation in the South China Sea. It is too 
early to tell what issues on his agenda Donald Trump 
will prioritise in Asia. 
China views American efforts to bring about a rap-
prochement between its two allies, Japan and South 
Korea, with great suspicion. A Chinese author claimed 
in an article on regional cooperation between China, 
Japan and South Korea that Seoul’s and Tokyo’s 
alliances with the US were making trilateral coopera-
tion more difficult; that they necessarily prevented 
Japan and South Korea from assuming international 
responsibility for cooperation in Northeast Asia; and 
that it was difficult for the three countries to develop 
common security interests and consensus on a joint 
approach.77 
Conclusion: 
Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation 
Modern history plays a role in all three dyads. This is 
especially true for the Japanese invasion and coloniali-
sation of its two neighbouring states from the late 
19th century onwards, and for the Korean War (1950–
53) in which all three countries were involved directly 
or, in the case of Japan, indirectly. Conflicts over the 
representation of history, territorial disputes and com-
peting narratives on national identity therefore cause 
tensions in all three sets of relations. However, the im-
pact of the past on the present is markedly different. 
In the case of China and Korea, the tensions it gen-
erates are relatively limited; for Korea’s and China’s 
relations with Japan, they are constitutive and constant. 
In the past few years, tensions in two of the three 
dyads have risen considerably – especially between 
Japan and China, but also between Japan and South 
Korea, although the 2015 “comfort women” agree-
ment temporarily raised hopes of better Japanese-
Korean relations. South Korea and China have steadily 
 
77 See Li Junan, “Zhong-Ri-Han quyu hezuo kunju ji 
Zhonggupo de celüe” [The dilemma of regional cooperation 
between China, Japan and Korea, and the Chinese tactic], 
Tianfu Xin Lun, no. 5 (2014): 84–89 (88). 
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upgraded their relationship, but Seoul’s decision to 
deploy the American THAAD missile defence system 
has disgruntled Beijing. The deterioration in Sino-Japa-
nese relations is particularly critical for the region’s 
stability. The strategic rivalry between the two powers 
is exacerbated by the fact that Japan is Washington’s 
most important ally in Asia and by Beijing interpret-
ing the US China policy as a containment strategy. The 
tensions between Japan and South Korea, by contrast, 
are less likely to spin out of control and lead to mili-
tary confrontation. Stabilising factors in this dyad 
include the fact that Tokyo and Seoul largely agree on 
the usefulness of the American presence in Asia and 
that Washington has a moderating influence on its 
two allies. 
Two factors influence the deterioration of China’s 
and Korea’s relations with Japan: the power shift 
between the three countries and their divergent stra-
tegic interests, which are based on different threat 
perceptions. While Japan’s economy has stagnated 
in the past two decades, pushing the country from 
second to third place in the world’s largest economies, 
China and South Korea have risen to become the 
second and eleventh-biggest economy, respectively. In 
keeping with their increased power, Beijing and Seoul 
are looking to exert more influence internationally; 
they also represent their interests and claims vis-à-vis 
Tokyo with more self-confidence. At the same time, 
dependencies in the relationships have shifted. China 
and Korea are no longer as dependent on Japanese 
investment and techonology or on bilateral trade with 
it as they were in the 1990s. On the contrary, Korea 
and increasingly China have become economic rivals 
to Japan, for instance in household electronics or the 
car industry. 
The three countries also have very different threat 
perceptions. While South Korea’s attention is primarily 
directed toward the North of the peninsula, Japan 
views China, with its growing economic and military 
potential, as the greatest threat. In turn, China is pri-
marily eyeing the US, which it considers its rival for 
influence in the region. The divergences this creates 
between the three actors’ strategic interests aggravate 
conflicts shaped by history and increase mutual dis-
trust. 
Two possible conclusions on trilateral cooperation 
emerge from the negative trends in Sino-Japanese and 
Korean-Japanese relations. One, it can be assumed that 
bilateral tensions also have an impact on the trilateral 
level, making threeway cooperation more difficult. 
Two, it can also be assumed that the trilateral format 
is especially significant in times of heightened ten-
sions. It is in itself remarkable that trilateral coopera-
tion continues at all in the face of bilateral conflicts. 
Given the power structure in Northeast Asia, South 
Korea is often described as a “shrimp among whales”. 
And yet the country has a special role to play among 
the three actors precisely because, as a medium-sized 
power, it is not viewed as a threat by its neighbours. 
However, negative consequences for trilateral coopera-
tion could arise if Tokyo and Beijing increasingly per-
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The trilateral cooperation between China, Japan and 
South Korea, which began in the late 1990s, encom-
passes a wide range of dialogues. According to the 
Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), these include 
summit meetings of the heads of government; 19 
ministerial conferences, including foreign, environ-
ment and health ministers; and over 50 interstate 
consultations. Within the trilateral configuration, 
more than 100 cooperative projects have so far been 
launched to promote social exchange, for instance 
through expert dialogues or youth summits.78 These 
activities are coordinated and administratively sup-
ported by the joint secretariat in Seoul, which was 
established in 2011. 
Origins and Development 
Trilateral cooperation began in the context of the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 as informal talks 
on the sidelines of joint meetings with the ASEAN 
states (so-called “ASEAN Plus Three”, or APT, meetings). 
The idea for annual meetings between the three coun-
tries was raised by the then-Japanese Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi in 1999, who saw a need for more inten-
sive cooperation on economic policy in the region, 
given that the symptoms of the crisis persisted.79 An 
early result of these joint talks was the Chiang Mai 
Initiative, which was officially announced at the APT 
Summit in March 2000 and continues, with some 
adaptations, to this day. Under this iniatiative, the 
ASEAN states as well as China, Japan and Korea agreed 
to create a network of bilateral currency-swap agree-
ments to prevent a renewed financial crisis in the 
region.80 In 2001 the trio’s heads of government also 
 
78 Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), Trilateral Co-
operation Overview, no date, http://www.tcs-asia.org/en/data/ 
overview.php (accessed 16 June 2016). 
79 Andrew I. Yeo, “South Korea’s Role in China-Japan-Korea 
Trilateral Relations” (unpublished paper presented as part of 
CSIS Korea Chair Project on “Study of South Korea as a Global 
Power”, 8 February 2016), 2f. 
80 Saori Katada, Banking on Stability: Japan and the Cross-Pacific 
Dynamics of International Financial Crisis Management (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 2001), 186. 
began a dialogue on topics such as environmental pro-
tection, fishing, terrorism and cross-border crime.81 
A new series of trilateral talk formats was introduced. 
These include track 1 talks (between government offi-
cials) – including meetings of the environment minis-
ters (since 1999), finance ministers (since 2001), econo-
my and trade ministers (since 2002) and tourism 
ministers (since 2006) – and also numerous track 2 dia-
logues between academics, former government offi-
cials and civil-society figures.82 
Trilateral cooperation suffered its first setback in 
2005 when the trio did not meet for summit talks 
on the sidelines of the APT summit, primarily due to 
tensions between China and Japan.83 China used the 
October 2005 visit by the Japanese Prime Minister 
Junichiro Koizumi to the controversial Yasukuni 
Shrine – already the fifth visit during his time in 
office, but an especially symbolic one, coming 60 years 
after the end of the War – as a reason to cancel the 
meeting. The trilateral summits resumed at the next 
APT meeting, in January 2007, after Abe Shinzo had 
becomeprime minister of Japan.84 
From 2007 to 2012 trilateral cooperation was con-
siderably institutionalised and intensified, primarily 
thanks to Japanese and Korean initiatives. The changes 
of government in Tokyo and Seoul and the 2008–2009 
financial crisis were critical for this development. Fol-
lowing a proposal by the new Japanese Prime Minister 
Fukuda Yasuo, China, Japan and South Korea agreed at 
the November 2007 APT meeting to hold their trilateral 
meetings annually and outside the APT format from 
then on.85 Trilateral cooperation was also boosted by 
Lee Myung-bak taking up office as president of South 
Korea in 2008, which improved relations between 
 
81 TCS, Trilateral Summit Meeting on the Occasion of ASEAN+3 Sum-
mit, 5 November 2001, no date, http://tcs-asia.org/bbs/board.php? 
bo_table=catg&wr_id=7&sca=85 (accessed 23 November 2016). 
82 TCS, Trilateral Cooperation Mechanisms, no date, http://www. 
tcs-asia.org/en/data/mechanism.php (accessed 17 June 2016). 
83 Yeo, “South Korea’s Role in China-Japan-Korea Trilateral 
Relations” (see note 79), 3. 
84 The tenth APT meeting was originally scheduled for 
December 2006 in the Philippines, but was postponed to 
January 2007 because of a typhoon warning. 
85 Yeo, “South Korea’s Role in China-Japan-Korea Trilateral 
Relations” (see note 79), 3. 
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Japan and Korea. Lee’s suggestion of establishing a per-
manent secretariat in Seoul to institutionalise the tri-
lateral format was met with approval at the 2010 sum-
mit – especially by the new Japanese Prime Minister 
Yukio Hatoyama, for whom regional cooperation was 
a foreign-policy priority.86 The three states equally 
share the expenses of the secretariat with its staff of 
30. The post of secretary-general alternates between 
the three countries every two years, with the two 
deputy secretaries-general always coming from the 
other two countries. 
The global financial crisis in 2008–2009 prompted 
China, Japan and South Korea to strengthen their 
cooperation on financial and economic issues. For 
example, the three countries agreed in 2008 to create 
an Asian fund of 80 billion US dollars to manage short-
term regional liquidity problems and thus avert the 
negative consequences of the financial crisis for the 
region.87 In 2009 the three states also initiated a regu-
lar dialogue between the chairpersons of their central 
banks. In 2010 the existing network of currency-swap 
agreements set up by the Chiang Mai Initiative was 
replaced by a multilateral swap agreement between 
China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN states; at 
the same time, a macroeconomic regulatory authority 
for the region was created.88 Additionally, in 2012 
Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul concluded a trilateral invest-
ment protection agreement that came into force in 
May 2014 and aims to facilitate investments between 
the three countries.89 The trio also decided in 2012 to 
open official negotiations on a free trade agreement; 
a feasibility study for such an accord already existed. 
During this phase, the three countries established a 
series of additional regular government consultations, 
including meetings of the foreign ministers (since 
2007), health ministers (since 2007), agriculture minis-
 
86 Interview with Shin Bong-kil, former secretary-general of 
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Alto: Stanford University Press, 2010), 97. 
88 Hanns Günther Hilpert and Howard Löwen, Auf dem Weg 
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2010A53_Hlp_ks.pdf (accessed 8 February 2017). 
89 Simon Böhmer and Patrick Köllner, Trilaterale Kooperation 
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Nordostasien?, GIGA Focus 4/2012 (Hamburg: German Institute 
of Global and Area Studies [GIGA], 2012); see also TCS, Annual 
Report Fiscal Year 2013–14, no date: 15, http://file.tcs-asia.org/ 
file_manager/files/tcs/publication/annual/2013-2014%20TCS% 
20Annual%20Report.pdf (accessed 20 June 2016). 
ters (since 2012) and heads of the disaster protection 
authorities (since 2009).90 The total number of tri-
lateral meetings rose from 55 in 2006 to over 90 in 
2010–2011 (see graph 20, p. 29). The three countries 
also emphasised their readiness to intensify coopera-
tion in a joint ten-year plan, the so-called Vision 2020. 
In the plan, the trio agreed to cooperate more closely 
on the economy, environmental protection, and social 
and cultural exchanges, and to make joint efforts to 
improve regional and international security, especial-
ly in dealing with non-traditional security risks such 
as terrorism, drug-smuggling and infectious diseas-
es.91 
From 2012 to 2014, trilateral cooperation stagnated 
once again. This was due to bilateral tensions, espe-
cially between Japan and China (caused by the nation-
alisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, see above) but 
also between Japan and Korea (because of South Korean 
President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to the Dokdo/Take-
shima Islands in August 2012). 
China used the bilateral disagreements as a reason 
to call off trilateral meetings of the heads of govern-
ment as well as meetings of the foreign, economy and 
trade ministers in 2013–2014.92 Whilst a total of 91 
trilateral meetings had taken place in 2011, by 2013 
that number dropped to 66. The reduction almost 
exclusively concerned high-ranking track 1 dialogues 
between government officials, while civil-society dia-
logues and track 1.5 dialogues (meetings between 
government officials and non-official figures) con-
tinued virtually unchanged.93 The dialogues that did 
take place between government officials primarily 
addressed less politically sensitive areas, such as 
environmental protection, disaster prevention and 
logistics. The annual meetings of the environment 
ministers, for example, were continued, even though 
China only sent the deputy minister rather than the 
minister himself, apparently as a sign of protest.94 
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In 2015 the trilateral format was revived, first via 
a meeting of the foreign ministers in March and then 
via a summit in November. No diplomatic break-
through was achieved; however, the three countries’ 
heads of government did agree to hold such top-level 
talks again regularly and strengthen trilateral co-
operation, for instance through a high-ranking dia-
logue on the Arctic.95 They also announced that they 
planned to accelerate negotiations on a joint free-
trade agreement. At the summit, Japan proposed 
establishing a Trilateral Cooperation Fund (TCF) to 
enable the trilateral secretariat to drive projects for-
ward more independently.96 Although the final deci-
sion is stillpending, the heads of government did note 
in their joint declaration that such a fund would be 
very useful for developing joint projects.97 As early as 
March 2015, the three sides also agreed to pursue 
Beijing’s 2013 proposal to establish a Network of Tri-
lateral Cooperation Think-Tanks (NCTC).98 This net-
work is supposed to draw up recommendations for 
intensifying trilateral cooperation and thus provide 
impetus for governmental talks. By 2015, total tri-
lateral meetings (81) were already back to the 2012 
level (80 meetings, see graph 20). 
Two factors favoured the resumption of summit 
meetings. One, in 2014 the three sides seem to have 
reached the conclusion that the tense political situa-
tion between Japan and its two neighbours was ham-
pering functional cooperation and represented a 
serious risk for the region, given the countries’ high 
levels of interdependence.99 The three countries used 
bilateral and trilateral channels to bring about a re-
newed rapprochement. The deputy foreign ministers, 
for instance, agreed at a meeting in September 2014 
to strengthen cooperation and explore the possibility 
 
environmental cooperation to the next level], Asahi Shimbun, 
8 May 2013. 
95 The first trilateral dialogue on the Arctic took place in 
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Annual% 20Report.pdf (accessed 25 November 2016). 
99 Interview with Cheol-Hee Park, Seoul National University, 
Seoul, December 2015. 
of a trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting.100 Two, South 
Korea has actively attempted to revive the threeway 
format in order to counteract further deterioration in 
the fraught Sino-Japanese relationship.101 Seoul used 
the trilateral format to breathe life back into commu-
nication between its two neighbours and to position it-
self as the mediator. In turn, in joint press statements 
Tokyo and Beijing acknowledged Seoul’s “active role” 
in the threeway configuration from 2013 to 2015.102 
The Trilateral Format: A Balance Sheet 
China, Japan and Korea are focusing their cooperation 
on politically less sensitive issues which have fairly 
good prospects of developing commonality. The highest 
number of trilateral dialogues and consultations con-
cern the economy, followed by environmental pro-
tection, and social and cultural affairs (see graph 20). 
However, even those dialogues that the TCS categorises 
as concerning politics and security primarily address 
non-traditional security issues, such as counter-terror-
ism, nuclear security and cybersecurity. At summits 
and foreign ministers’ meetings, the three countries 
do discuss regional and international developments, 
but concrete cooperation on traditional security ques-
tions has so far failed to materialise. 
The former TCS secretary-general, Shin Bong-kil, 
deems that the greatest progress in trilateral coopera-
tion has been made in environmental protection.103 
Yet, to date this cooperation has rarely gone beyond 
joint research, data modelling, and exchanges of ex-
pertise and experience in environmental measures.104 
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None of the three countries has shown any interest in 
binding agreements or control mechanisms for imple-
menting them. It is also unclear what the division of 
labour is between the trilateral format under the TCS 
and other regional dialogues on environmental pro-
tection, created as long ago as the 1990s. Air pollution, 
for instance, is a highly relevant issue for all three 
countries because seasonal winds spread desert sand 
and acidic pollutants over the entire region.105 Since 
2014 representatives of the three countries have been 
meeting for the Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Air Pol-
lution (TPDAP). However, two other projects in this 
field have existed since the late 1990s: the Acid Depo-
sition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), which 
is under the aegis of Japan and has 13 member states, 
and the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Project 
(LTP), which is led by South Korea and has been joined 
by Japan and China.106 In other areas of environmen-
 
105 Reinhard Drifte, Transboundary Pollution as an Issue in North-
east Asian Regional Politics, ARC Working Paper 12/2005 (Lon-
don: Asia Research Centre [ARC], 2005), 16, http://www2.lse. 
ac.uk/asia ResearchCentre/_files/ARCWP12-Drifte.pdf 
(accessed 15 June 2016). 
106 Sangmin Nam and Heejoo Lee, “Reverberating beyond 
the Region in Addressing Air Pollution in Northeast Asia” 
(Paper presented at Workshop “Comparing Regional Environ-
mental Governance in East Asia and Europe”, Kyoto, 24/25 
tal protection, the trilateral format also duplicates 
pre-existing dialogues and cooperation. But even in 
the absence of a clear division of labour (and therefore 
of a correspondingly clear added value), trilateral con-
sultations are certainly making a contribution to 
the regional exchange of information on the environ-
ment, a contribution whose value should not be 
underestimated despite all criticism.107 
In economic matters, the currency-swap agree-
ments – intended to protect against currency and 
financial crises – are among the greatest successes of 
the cooperation between China, Japan, Korea and the 
ASEAN states. The trilateral investment protection 
agreement concluded in 2012 regulates the protection 
of intellectual property and prohibits, for example, 
the practice of forcing foreign companies to use do-
mestic delivery firms. In addition, it has rules on arbi-
tration of disputes between investors and the state.108 
In this, the trilateral agreement goes beyond existing 
bilateral accords. Yet quite a few restrictions on invest-
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ments remain. China continues to ban foreign inves-
tors from becoming majority owners of Chinese car 
or steel companies.109 Other critical issues were also 
excluded from the agreement, such as improved mar-
ket-access rights in China or the introduction of a so-
called negative list, which would explicitly list sectors 
to which foreign investors are granted only limited 
access. It therefore remains to be seen to what extent 
the agreement stimulates investment between the 
three countries. The 2015 numbers, at least, show no 
increased investment among the trio. 
The idea of a trilateral free-trade agreement has 
been under discussion since 2002, but the negotia-
tions, which have been ongoing since 2013, have been 
challenging. A TCS report from December 2016 notes 
that the talks “have progressed very slowly, although 
some limited results have been achieved”.110 So far, 
the parties have not even been able to agree on a date 
by which the negotiations should be concluded.111 
South Korea is currently showing the least enthusiasm 
in the negotiations as it considers itself to have a com-
petitive advantage over Japan on the Chinese market 
due to its 2015 free-trade agreement with China.112 A 
trilateral accord could negate South Korea’s advantage 
and would thus be positive for Japan.113 China’s inter-
est in a trilateral free-trade zone has grown since 
12 Pacific Rim states – including the US, Canada and 
Japan –concluded a comprehensive free-trade agree-
ment (the Trans-Pacific Partnership or TPP) in late 
2015. In Beijing the TPP caused concerns that funda-
mental trade and investment rules for the region were 
being negotiated in China’s absence. It has therefore 
called for an acceleration of the trilateral FTA negotia-
tions.114 A central question is whether the trilateral 
free-trade agreement being sought would be modelled 
on the already existing one between China and South 
Korea or else on the TPP. The latter would be much 
more ambitious and would require enormous con-
cessions from China.115 A few days after taking up 
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the FTA], Asahi Shimbun, 2 June 2015. 
114 Anon., “Chūkan FTA, Kankoku hijun” (see note 112). 
115 See Jiang Yuechun, “Zhong Ri Han shounao huiwu 
chongqi yu sanfang hezuo de weilai” [Resumption of China-
office, President Trump signed a decree to withdraw 
the US from the TPP. This does not necessarily mean 
that China will lose interest in large free-trade agree-
ments. President Xi Jinping emphasised China’s con-
tinued commitment to globalisation and free trade as 
well as corresponding regional agreements, both at 
the APEC Summit in Peru in November 2016 and at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2017. 
If the Chinese interpret the anti-globalisation protest 
movements in western industrialised nations as being 
essentially aimed at China, the pressure to make con-
cessions might even grow. 
In social and cultural affairs, China, Korea and 
Japan have initiated a number of civil-society dia-
logues, such as various youth-exchange programmes. 
The three countries want to simplify study periods 
abroad for students through the project Collective 
Action for the Mobility Program of University Students 
in Asia (CAMPUS Asia) by mutually recognising 
academic results and granting scholarships.116 The 
programme, which was in its test phase until early 
2016, has been compared to the EU’s Erasmus pro-
gramme by TCS Secretary-General Yang Houlan.117 
That comparison seems premature since the scope and 
institutionalisation of CAMPUS Asia are still modest: 
only about 2,000 students from the three countries 
took part in the four-year test phase.118 
Some experts have been critical of the trio for not 
consistently implementing group decisions.119 One 
reason for this may be that objectives tend to be for-
mulated only loosely at summit meetings. The ten-
year plan for trilateral cooperation adopted in 2010, 
Vision 2020, illustrates this perfectly. The plan – 
which Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul view as a milestone – 
lists over 40 points on which the countries intend to 
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cooperate more closely, but sets hardly any concrete 
targets.120 
The Significance of the Trilateral Format 
Overall, trilateral cooperation continues to be fragile, 
despite its institutionalisation. It excludes traditional 
security issues almost entirely and, even in less politi-
cally sensitive areas, it can only claim negligible suc-
cesses. Tensions between China and Japan, in particu-
lar, led to a marked reduction in trilateral dialogues 
in 2013 and 2014. 
And yet, despite this sobering balance sheet, the 
threeway cooperation is not insignificant. The format 
offers a framework for exchanging views and interests 
and stimulating group projects. Whenever bilateral 
relations deteriorate, the trilateral format at least con-
tributes to keeping open channels of communication 
below the level of “high politics”. When historical 
animosities flare up, bilateral summit meetings with 
Japan are domestically controversial in China and 
South Korea. At those moments, the threeway format 
offers political “camouflage” for talks.121 President 
Park thus considered the November 2015 trilateral 
summit to be the best context for her first bilateral 
meeting with Abe as well.122 
Shigeo Iwatani, TCS secretary-general from Septem-
ber 2013 to August 2015, acknowledged in an inter-
view with the Chinese newspaper Global Times that 
trilateral cooperation in policy and security was not 
yet well developed and that opportunities needed to 
be created that could actually be realised. He attributed 
a stabilising role to the TCS in a difficult political 
environment. He also emphasised that the threeway 
cooperation was open to further actors, such as Rus-
sia, Mongolia or the US. In this context, he pointed to 
the collaboration between the TCS and the Northeast 
Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI), led by 
South Korean President Park Geun-hye.123 
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China, Korea and Japan use their cooperation to 
pursue different interests, which might limit the 
potential of the trilateral format. For Korea, the three-
way format offers a chance to meet its two more 
powerful neighbours on an equal footing and make a 
more significant mark in foreign policy.124 A number 
of Korean experts believe that Seoul can mediate 
between China and Japan and so avoid being caught 
in this regional rivalry.125 
China sees trilateral cooperation as central to the 
region’s economic development and political stability; 
at the same time, it views it as an instrument for coun-
teracting “external pressure” (i.e. from the US, with its 
“rebalancing to Asia”).126 Beijing hoped to counter the 
US-dominated TPP with a trilateral free-trade agree-
ment127, but also concedes that strengthening eco-
nomic cooperation is a priority because in the short 
term no breakthroughs in policy or security can be ex-
pected between China, Japan and Korea.128 For Beijing, 
free trade between the three countries is also an im-
portant building block for wider trade liberalisation 
projects in the region, such as the Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, encompassing 
ASEAN+6) and the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP, APEC-wide). Japanese observers believe, more-
over, that China wants to use the trilateral coopera-
tion to strengthen the ASEAN+3 format (all ASEAN 
countries plus China, Japan and Korea) against the 
ASEAN+6 configuration (ASEAN plus China, Japan, 
Korea, India, New Zealand and Australia, now ex-
tended to include Russia and the US as well), which 
is favoured by Japan.129 
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Japan uses the threeway format to integrate China 
and keep channels of communication open.130 How-
ever, it is growing less confident in its ability to be the 
agenda-setter – presumably because it worries that 
South Korea might increasingly take China’s side.131 
That would explain Japan’s efforts under Abe to col-
laborate more closely in security matters with other 
states both within and outside the region. 
America’s stance on the threeway format is ambiva-
lent, as Christopher Hill, the former deputy foreign 
minister for East Asia and the Pacific, observes. On the 
one hand, Washington encouraged the trio to hold its 
foreign ministers’ meeting in March 2015; on the other 
hand, the US government is concerned that successful 
trilateral cooperation might reduce its ability to push 
its own interests in the region and contain China.132 
A trilateral summit planned for 2016 was cancelled 
due to the domestic political crisis in South Korea.133 
According to Japanese reports, Beijing also had blocked 
preparations for the meeting, allegedly because it was 
annoyed by Tokyo’s increasingly open opposition to 
China’s activities in the South China Sea.134 The three 
foreign ministers did meet in Tokyo in August 2016.135 
It remains to be seen, nevertheless, whether coopera-
tion between the three countries really has been “com-
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Bilateral and/or Trilateral: The Outlook 
 
Competing historical narratives, territorial disputes 
and divergent strategic interests limit the cooperation 
between China, Japan and South Korea – on both the 
bilateral and trilateral level. In Sino-Korean relations, 
the historical legacy only plays a minor part and, 
compared to the other two dyads, causes fewer ten-
sions. And yet even this relationship is not without 
problems, as developments in 2016 have shown. 
Relations worsened noticeably after June of that year, 
when Seoul announced its decision to deploy the 
American missile defence system, THAAD. 
In the past few years, the volatility and tensions 
within the Northeast Asian triangle have primarily 
been caused by competition for primacy in the Asia 
Pacific between the US and China. Against this back-
drop, China and Japan are each suspicious about the 
other’s rapprochement with South Korea, instead of 
seeing it as positive momentum for regional stability. 
In turn, Seoul is watching the increasing Sino-Japa-
nese rivalry with concern, but has little influence over 
it. Possibilities for developing the trilateral coopera-
tion format between China, Japan and Korea will 
remain limited during the next few years if Sino-
American relations continue to be primarily or even 
increasingly characterised by strategic competition. 
However, should the US under President Trump 
reduce its commitment to Asia – as its allies fear – 
and/or make strategic concessions to China, then 
repercussions on the trilateral format are hard to 
predict. Beijing might try to extend its regional in-
fluence by strengthening multilateral forms of co-
operation in which the US does not participate. China 
has already announced its intention to drive forward 
the RCEP free-trade agreement, which encompasses 
the ten ASEAN states as well as Australia, China, India, 
Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. This announce-
ment followed Trump’s declaration in November 2016 
that he would withdraw from the trans-pacific FTA, 
TPP, at the start of his period in office. 
Optimists argue that the economic interdependen-
cies of China, Japan and South Korea have a moderat-
ing influence on bilateral relations. However, follow-
ing that logic, the fact that the reciprocal economic 
significance of Japan and China and Japan and Korea 
is, if anything, declining might well have a negative 
impact. In addition, China evidently resorts to coer-
cive economic measures (rare earths, tourism) when 
there are political tensions, even though it will not 
officially acknowledge it. Yet even if the socioeconom-
ic interdependence in Northeast Asia persists, political 
relations within the trio are likely to remain extremely 
fragile. Public opinion is deteriorating in all three 
dyads. 
Cooperation on security policy is very weak in all 
three bilateral relations – surprisingly so in the case of 
South Korea and Japan, since both are allies of the US. 
The distribution of power between the three regional 
states has shifted since circa 2010. South Korea is still 
the “shrimp among whales”, but Japan has lost in rela-
tive economic weight during the past decade and a 
half, and has been overtaken by China as the world’s 
second-largest economy. 
North Korea’s threatening behaviour and its pro-
gress in nuclear and missile programmes force South 
Korea to focus its foreign policy on the Korean pen-
insula and Northeast Asia. By contrast, Japan under 
Prime Minister Abe has made an effort to garner more 
security partners and political support both within 
and outside of East Asia. China’s foreign-policy vision 
under the leadership of Xi goes far beyond the imme-
diate neighbourhood: its Silk Road Initiative encom-
passes Eurasia as well as Southeast and South Asia, 
and goes all the way to Africa via West Asia. These dif-
ferences also have an impact on the importance that 
each country attributes to the trilateral format. 
Whenever there is resentment in one or more of the 
three dyads, it is especially the level of “high politics” 
that suffers in the trilateral context: at least one side 
rejects summit meetings, whether bilateral or trilateral 
ones. In any case, topics that are sensitive for politics 
or security have been largely excluded from the three-
way talks. Trilateral agreements primarily concern 
functional areas that are less politically sensitive, but 
even in these there have been no far-reaching imple-
mentations to date. Trilateral cooperation also tends 
to be directed inward, at collaborating with each 
other: except in economics, there are hardly any initia-
tives directed towards the whole East Asian region. 
The usefulness of the trilateral format has so far 
been in maintaining channels of communication at 
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the working level even during times of heightened 
tensions, and in providing a platform for discussing 
common interests and exploring possibilities for high-
ranking meetings. If the threeway format were further 
institutionalized, that might better protect it from the 
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ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone 
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
APT ASEAN Plus Three 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
ASEAN+3 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South 
Korea 
ASEAN+6 ASEAN countries plus China, Japan, South Korea, 
India, Australia, New Zealand 
CAMPUS Asia Collective Action for the Mobility Program of 
University Students in Asia 
CDIS Coordinated Direct Investment Survey 
CRS Congressional Research Service 
EANET Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia 
EU European Union 
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(Paris) 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
FTAAP Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(Hamburg) 
GSOMIA General Security of Military Information 
Agreement 
ICS Institute of Chinese Studies (Delhi) 
IFANS Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security 
(Seoul) 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
JETRO Japan External Trade Organization 
KAS Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
LTP Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution Project 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAPCI Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NTCT Network of Trilateral Cooperation Think-Tanks 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
ROK Republic of Korea 
SLBM Submarine-launched ballistic missile 
TCOG Trilateral Cooperation and Oversight Group 
TCS Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat 
THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
TPDAP Tripartite Policy Dialogue on Air Pollution 
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
USNI U.S. Naval Institute 
 
